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Based on in vitro data, the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration recommends chemical disinfection of raw sprout
seeds to reduce enteric pathogens contaminating the seed
coats. However, little is known about the effectiveness of decon-
tamination at preventing human disease. In 1999, an outbreak
of Salmonella enterica serotype Mbandaka occurred in Oregon,
Washington, Idaho, and California. Based on epidemiologic and
pulsed-field gel electrophoresis evidence from 87 confirmed
cases, the outbreak was linked to contaminated alfalfa seeds
grown in California’s Imperial Valley. Trace-back and trace-for-
ward investigations identified a single lot of seeds used by five
sprout growers during the outbreak period. Cases of salmonel-
losis were linked with two sprout growers who had not
employed chemical disinfection; no cases were linked to three
sprout growers who used disinfection. This natural experiment
provides empiric evidence that chemical disinfection can reduce
the human risk for disease posed by contaminated seed
sprouts.
D
espite the popular perception of sprouts as health food,
alfalfa and other varieties of raw seed sprouts are common
vehicles for produce-associated bacterial foodborne illness.
Although sprout-associated outbreaks have been reported since
1973 (1), back-to-back multinational outbreaks of gastroenteri-
tis with Salmonella enterica serotypes Newport and Stanley in
1995 and 1996 (2,3) and the 1996 Sakai city outbreak of
enterohemorrhagic  Escherichia coli O157:H7 in >5,000
Japanese schoolchildren have refocused attention on the public
health hazard posed by seed sprouts (4).
The risk for disease from sprouts is connected to seed pro-
duction and distribution factors and the sprouting process itself.
Seeds may be reared, harvested, milled, and sprouted locally or
shipped globally to sprout growers; bacterial contamination
may occur at any point in this chain (5). During germination,
seeds are presoaked in water and then germinated in a warm,
moist, aerated environment for 3 to 7 days. Replication of
pathogens by three to five orders of magnitude may occur dur-
ing sprouting, resulting in high pathogen levels on mature
sprouts, despite the fact that initial densities are low and the
pathogens dispersed irregularly throughout seeds (6). In an
experimental model of seed contamination, Salmonella Stanley
added to alfalfa seeds increased from ~2°10
3 bacteria per gram
of mature sprouts to 10
7 bacteria per gram after 48–72 hours
incubation, without affecting the appearance, smell, or taste of
the sprouts (6). 
Methods proposed to reduce the risk to human consumers
include testing seeds, irrigation water, and sprouts for
pathogens (7–12) and disinfecting seeds (13–16). In vitro, treat-
ing seeds with 20,000 ppm calcium hypochlorite [Ca(OCl)2]
pregermination reduces pathogen densities by up to 2.2 logs
(13,14). Higher concentrations of disinfectant or the use of con-
centrated acids, high temperatures, or bleaches reduces
pathogen levels by >3 log; these treatments substantially reduce
the proportion of seeds that germinate (16,17). Notably, none of
these methods completely eliminates pathogens on seeds.
Based on these data, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) currently recommends that seeds be treated with 20,000
ppm Ca(OCl)2 pregermination and that sprouts and spent irriga-
tion water samples be periodically tested for enteric pathogens.
The number of sprout growers (referred to as “sprouters”) who
follow these guidelines, as well as the proportion of sprouts
grown from disinfected seeds, is unknown.
S. Mbandaka, an uncommon serotype in Oregon, occurred
from 1988 to 1998 at an average rate of 1.5 cases per year.
From January to April 1999, the Oregon Department of Human
Services (ODHS) conducted an outbreak investigation in
response to a sharp increase in cases of S. Mbandaka in what
soon proved to be a multistate outbreak. This investigation ulti-
mately provided insight into the efficacy of seed disinfection. 
Methods
We defined case-patients as persons with culture-confirmed
S. Mbandaka infection and onset of acute illness from January
1 to April 15, 1999. Cases were excluded if they were subse-
quently shown to have a pulsed field gel electrophoresis
(PFGE) pattern that differed from the outbreak pattern. If the
illness onset date was unknown, the specimen collection date
minus 2 days was used instead. 
To generate hypotheses about potential exposure vehicles,
ODHS conducted open-ended interviews with the first 10
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a 2:1 (controls:cases) age-matched case-control study using
these cases. Age-matched controls were identified by sequen-
tially adding or subtracting one digit from each case-patient’s
telephone number prefix. Matched ranges were: 1–18, 19–50,
and 51–100 years of age. Using a standardized food question-
naire, we asked respondents about consumption of food that
typically carries Salmonella during the preceding week.
After alfalfa sprouts were implicated, we traced the source
of sprouts from the case-patients to the brand of sprout’s point
of production to identify a common source for the contaminat-
ed sprouts. Onsite investigations of an implicated sprouter were
conducted in partnership with the Washington Department of
Agriculture and the FDA. Seed, water, and sprout samples were
collected for culture with sterile swabs and containers. 
Because alfalfa seeds are often produced in bulk, we con-
ducted trace-back and trace-forward investigations using pur-
chase invoices and shipping records to identify other sprouters
who may have purchased and used potentially contaminated
seeds from the same production lot. Other sprouters who pur-
chased this lot were asked about their use of the implicated lot,
including quantities sprouted and their seed-disinfection prac-
tices. To identify additional cases, we queried health depart-
ments throughout the United States and Canada, with specific
attention to states where seed from the implicated lot had been
distributed.
Laboratory Methods
All Salmonella isolates from patients were serotyped at the
Oregon, California, Washington, and Idaho state laboratories.
Salmonella cultures were performed according to standard
methods (18,19). PFGE, by using the restriction enzyme XbaI
(Boehringer Mannheim, Indianapolis, IN), was used to corrob-
orate genetic relatedness of S. Mbandaka isolates according to
the method of Tenover et al. (20). Given the rarity of S.
Mbandaka, we did not consider it necessary to use two or more
restriction enzymes to achieve a still higher degree of resolu-
tion with PFGE. Two S. Mbandaka isolates from 1997 to 1998
were used as reference standards.
Statistical Methods
We calculated matched odds ratios, 95% confidence inter-
vals, and p values using Exact (21). A two-tailed p value of
<0.05 was considered significant. Using food frequency data
from Oregon FoodNet showing that ~10% of Oregonians con-
sume sprouts on a weekly basis (22), we performed a binomial
calculation of the probability that the observed proportion of
sprout exposure among cases was due to chance (23).
Results
Descriptive Epidemiology 
From January 1 to April 15, 1999, a total of 89 cases of S.
Mbandaka were identified in four states: Oregon (42 cases),
Washington (19 cases), Idaho (7 cases), and California (21
cases) (Figure 1); 74% of the case-patients were women, and
the median age was 28 years of age (range, 6 months to 98
years; interquartile range: 19–41 years). Two additional cases
were not included because neither could be linked epidemio-
logically with the outbreak and both had different PFGE pat-
terns. S. Mbandaka was cultured from 69 stool samples, 14
urine samples, three blood cultures, one abscess, one blood and
stool sample, and one unspecified source. The association
between female sex and urinary isolates tended towards signif-
icance (p=0.06, Fisher exact test). Two cases clustered within a
household, but were not considered to represent secondary
spread of the disease, as they occurred concurrently. No
patients died. 
Nine of the first 10 case-patients and none of 20 matched
control-patients reported eating or handling alfalfa sprouts
(matched odds ratios were undefined [zero in denominator];
95% confidence interval 3.4 to ∞; p<0.001). No other food
vehicles were statistically associated with illness. From the
binomial theorem, given an expected frequency of 10%, the
probability of 9 out of 10 persons reporting sprout consumption
within the past week was <1/1000 (22). 
Identification of Sprout Source 
The first 10 Oregon case-patients reported eating sprouts
from one or more of five growers (sprouters A, B, C, D, and X).
Trace-back investigation showed that the common link
between most cases was sprouter X (Figure 2). Eight of nine
case-patients reported eating sprouts that could have come
from sprouter X. Five of these eight cases had potential links to
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Figure 1. Epidemic curve of Salmonella Mbandaka outbreak, 1999. Line
indicates the timing of the Oregon Health Division’s press release alert-
ing the public of the outbreak. A lot L seed embargo and voluntary recall
of brand X sprouts also occurred at this time.other sprouters in addition to sprouter X, while three of the
eight cases could be traced only to sprouter X. 
The index patient of S. Mbandaka provided a leftover sam-
ple of sprout X brand alfalfa sprouts. Cultures from this sample
subsequently grew S. Mbandaka.
Onsite Investigations at Sprouter X’s Facility
Based on these investigations, representatives of the
Washington Department of Health and FDA inspected the
sprouter X facility on February 12, 1999, and determined that
alfalfa sprouts grown during the outbreak period came from a
single seed lot (lot L). Trace-forward information from the seed
distributor and interviews with the other area sprout growers
confirmed that sprouter X was the only grower in the Pacific
Northwest to have purchased lot L seeds. Moreover, the illness
onset date for the Oregon index case occurred 2 weeks after this
sprouter received a shipment of lot L and 1 week after sprouts
grown from lot L first reached market.
S. Mbandaka was isolated from 11 of 12 alfalfa sprout sam-
ples, and one of two lot L seed samples obtained from the
sprouter X facility. No pathogens were identified from this
sprouter’s samples of radish, onion, and clover sprouts, seed
samples from non–lot L seeds, or samples of irrigation water.
Inspectors determined that no seed disinfection had been
used at the sprouter X facility. The owner of the facility
informed us that disinfection was “unnecessary” because seed
samples had tested negative for pathogens before being shipped
from the seed broker. 
After this inspection, sprouter X issued a voluntary recall of
all products. Existing stocks of alfalfa sprouts were impound-
ed, and the company was instructed to cease further production
of sprouts using lot L seeds. A press release from the Oregon
Department of Human Services was issued on February 12,
1999, advising consumers to return brand X sprouts and retail-
ers to return unsold stocks.
Genetic Analysis of S. Mbandaka Isolates
The PFGE patterns for the S. Mbandaka isolates from stool
samples from the initial 10 case-patients, the partially con-
sumed box of sprout X retrieved from case-patient 1, and the
onsite sprout and seed sample cultures were indistinguishable
but clearly differed from the two S. Mbandaka reference sam-
ples obtained in 1997 and 1998. Of the final 89 cases, 87 had
identical PFGE patterns; 2 case-patients included in the total
were not tested for technical reasons.
Trace-Back and Trace-Forward Investigations of Lot L
Sprouter X purchased lot L seeds from a California broker.
This broker, in turn, purchased seeds from California seed pro-
ducer Z. Purchase invoices indicated that 5,454 kg of seed from
18,000 kg of lot L had been distributed among five sprout
growers other than sprouter X: sprouters E, F, G, H, and Y
(Table). Four sprouters were located in California and one in
Florida (sprouter E). Of the 5,454 kg of seed sold to sprouters,
3,864 kg (70.2%) had already been sprouted by the time of the
embargo. Of this seed, sprouters X and Y had used 2,610 kg
(68%) and sprouters E, F, and G had used 1,254 kg (32%)
(Table). Sprouter H had not yet used any lot L seed.
Of the five sprouters who used lot L seeds, two were linked
to the S. Mbandaka outbreak. Isolates from Washington,
Oregon, and Idaho were traced to sprouter X in Washington
State; all California cases were traced to sprouter Y. Neither
sprouter X nor Yhad used seed disinfection during the outbreak
period. Of the three sprouters (E, F, and G) using lot L seed but
not linked to cases of S. Mbandaka, all reported disinfecting
their seeds with 2,000–20,000 ppm Ca(OCl)2, or 200 ppm sodi-
um hypochlorite (Table). 
All seeds from lot Lcame from a single farm in California’s
Imperial Valley. Although we were unable to determine how
the seeds became contaminated, an inspection of the farm
showed numerous opportunities for contamination by wild and
domestic animals or river water.
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Figure 2. Trace-back investigations of Oregon cases of Salmonella
Mbandaka. *Case-patient 6 recalled no sprout exposure. Solid lines
indicate trace-back routes leading to sprouter X. Dashed lines indicate
trace-back routes leading to other sprouters.
Table. Fate of lot L alfalfa seeds 
Sprouter (state)  Quantity purchased (kg)  Quantity sprouted (kg)  Seed disinfection  Linked cases 
Sprouter X (Washington)  909  860  None  68 
Sprouter Y (California)  1,818  1,750  None  21 
Sprouter E (Florida)  909  909  20,000 ppm Ca(OCl)2  0 
Sprouter F (California)  909  45  20,000 ppm Ca(OCl)2  0 
Sprouter G (California)  450  300  500 ppm NaOCl  0 
Sprouter H (California)  450  0  ND
a  0 
Totals  5,454  3,864     
aND, not determined. The method of disinfection did not apply to sprouter H because this sprouter had not used any lot L seeds by the time of the embargo. Discussion
The epidemiologic, laboratory, and environmental evidence
shows that alfalfa sprouts germinated from lot L seeds were the
cause of this outbreak. The fact that two geographically distant
sprouters (X and Y) were linked to cases of S. Mbandaka sug-
gests that the seeds became contaminated before distribution to
sprouters. Given the historic underreporting of salmonellosis,
the 89 confirmed cases of S. Mbandaka probably represent sev-
eral thousand cases (24). Salmonellosis is typically most preva-
lent in patients <1 year of age (25,26), so the fact that women
19–41 years of age predominated in this outbreak is notewor-
thy. This pattern was observed in several previous sprout-asso-
ciated outbreaks (3,27–30). We believe this pattern reflects the
demographics of sprout consumers and does not imply that
women of this age range are inherently predisposed to salmo-
nellosis in general or to S. Mbandaka in particular. As noted in
previous outbreaks, the urinary tract was a common site of
infection among women (28).
The outbreak was limited to consumers of sprouts grown by
two sprouters who used the same seed lot. Neither sprouter
used the FDA-recommended seed-disinfection process. Of the
three sprouters who disinfected their seeds, none were linked to
cases, although they had used 32% of the lot L seed that was
sprouted. This finding suggests that seed disinfection does
reduce the risk for human disease posed by seed sprouts.
Since a formal randomized trial of seed disinfection in the
community would be unethical, our understanding of the use-
fulness of disinfection is based largely on observations made in
the course of outbreak investigations. In the current study, this
outbreak fortuitously served as a natural experiment of the
effectiveness of seed disinfection.
Few other published outbreak investigations have addressed
the value of disinfection at preventing human disease. Clover
sprouts were implicated in a 1999 outbreak in Colorado (31).
The two sprouters involved also grew sprouts from a common
seed lot, though only one sprouter reported followed the FDA’s
disinfection guidelines. Salmonellosis linked to the sprouter
using disinfection occurred at a rate of 0.29 cases per 50 kg bag
of seed versus 1.13 cases per 50 kg bag from the sprouter not
using disinfection. The investigators concluded that disinfection
reduced, but did not eliminate, the risk for human salmonellosis. 
In another recent outbreak, Proctor et al. investigated a mul-
tistate alfalfa sprout–associated salmonellosis outbreak in which
20,000 ppm Ca(OCl)2 disinfection was used (30). This outbreak
was confined to a single sprouter; in the absence of a “control”
sprouter not using disinfection, ascertaining whether disease
rates would have been even higher is impossible. Nevertheless,
both outbreaks amply demonstrate that disinfection is an imper-
fect remedy for the problem of contaminated seed sprouts.
The inoculum size needed to cause infection is known to
vary between different serotypes of Salmonella (32–34).
Because disinfection reduces but does not eliminate pathogens,
this variation might account for some of the apparent disinfec-
tion failures if levels were not reduced below some critical
threshold. Human error may also be to blame. In a recent sur-
vey of disinfection practices of area mung-bean and green
sprouters (green sprouts include alfalfa, clover, radish, and
onion sprouts) who reported observing the FDA guidelines,
California investigators noted that six of seven green sprouters
and one of nine mung-bean sprouters succeeded in reaching the
target of 20,000 ppm Ca(OCl)2 (J. Thomas, unpub. data).
Accordingly, future investigations should include careful
reviews of the disinfection records of implicated sprouters.
Receipts for seed-disinfection chemicals, protocols for disin-
fection, and disinfection logs may prove useful clues to actual
disinfection practices. Asking the sprouter to simulate the dis-
infection process may also be instructive. 
Given these limitations, a more reliable method of deconta-
mination is needed if eating sprouts is to be safe. Gamma irra-
diation of sprout seeds or mature product reduces or eliminates
colonizing bacteria. However, the prohibitive expense of irradi-
ating machinery places this technology beyond the means of
most sprouters. Moreover, irradiating seeds reduces the germi-
nation yield and affects the appearance of mature sprouts that
germinate (35,36). Marketing irradiated sprouts to health-con-
scious consumers may prove challenging, given the frequent
misconception that irradiated sprouts are themselves radioac-
tive. A concerted public awareness campaign might avoid con-
sumer anxiety about this process. Sprouters could also pool
resources towards the collective purchase or use of irradiating
machines. Cooking sprouts is highly effective at eliminating
pathogens but is not a popular remedy because sprouts are typ-
ically consumed raw.
The pathogen detection assay used at the request of sprouter
X did not detect the S. Mbandaka contaminating the lot Lseeds.
The test used a proprietary protocol wherein several grams of
seed were randomly sampled for testing from each 50-kg bag
of seed by using a monoclonal antibody-based enzyme-linked
immunoassay (Silliker Laboratories, pers. comm.). Regardless
of the assay’s sensitivity, this technique appears highly vulner-
able to sampling error unless the pathogen is uniformly distrib-
uted throughout the seed. Notably, research to date indicates
that pathogens are dispersed heterogeneously and at low densi-
ties on seeds (37,38). Compounding this vulnerability, the
assay used was designed only to detect Salmonella, a shortcom-
ing given that enterohemorrhagic E. coli outbreaks linked to
sprouts have occurred repeatedly (28,39–43). 
In the current outbreak, a negative test was cited by the
sprouter X’s proprietor as the rationale for disregarding FDA
recommendations. This failure is noteworthy given that S.
Mbandaka was isolated from seeds both by the California
Microbial Diseases Laboratory, Berkeley, California, and the
FDA Laboratory in Bothell, Washington., by using more sensi-
tive enrichment and detection processes. Currently, FDA does
not advocate routine seed screening, although it does recom-
mend testing sprouts or spent irrigation water samples for
enteric pathogens (18), neither of which was performed by
sprouter X.
For the time being, FDAshould continue to promote adher-
ence with its guidelines for disinfecting seeds and testing
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Association (ISGA), a private trade group, has responsibly
encouraged adherence among its members by allowing
sprouters who use 20,000-ppm Ca(OCl)2 disinfection and pass
a third-party production inspection to label their sprouts as
ISGA-certified. However, this precaution has yet to be translat-
ed into a marketing advantage through retailer and consumer
education; compliance remains voluntary, and no systematic
data exist indicating the proportion of sprouters who adhere to
the guidelines. Adherence with a uniform disinfection process
might be improved if made subject to regulation or if retailers
were to insist on “ISGA-certified treated seed” in their pur-
chase contracts for sprouts.
Given repeated outbreaks, seed testing that is falsely reas-
suring, ineffectiveness and incompleteness of seed disinfection,
and a lack of commitment to disinfected product from retailers,
we think that consistently rendering raw sprouts free of enteric
pathogens is not practical. Persons at increased risk for invasive
salmonellosis and those wishing to reduce their risk for food-
borne infections may be well advised to avoid sprouts entirely.
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